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Abstract: In Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, Geoffrey 
Bowker and Susan Star present a model of classification in which informal 
classification practices, performed by people through their everyday, ad-hoc 
decision-making, necessarily subvert the formal classification schemes, 
characterized as systemic and bureaucratic, within which they are performed. 
While this model affords significant theoretical purchase on classification 
practices, this paper show that a more nuanced relationship exists between 
formal and informal classification. The practices through which Canadian 
government officials evaluate and respond to requests for financial aid in the 
wake of disasters provide instances of classification in which informal 
classification reinforces, rather than subverts, formal classification. 
Résumé: In Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, Geoffrey 
Bowker and Susan Star present a model of classification in which informal 
classification practices, performed by people through their everyday, ad-hoc 
decision-making, necessarily subvert the formal classification schemes, 
characterized as systemic and bureaucratic, within which they are performed. 
While this model affords significant theoretical purchase on classification 
practices, this paper show that a more nuanced relationship exists between 
formal and informal classification. The practices through which Canadian 
government officials evaluate and respond to requests for financial aid in the 
wake of disasters provide instances of classification in which informal 
classification reinforces, rather than subverts, formal classification. 
With their book Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequen-
ces,1 Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star demonstrate that studying 
classification as social practice provides opportunities for critical insight 
into the ways in which classification affects everyday realities. Through a 
series of theoretical and empirical discussions, they highlight just how 
deeply embedded classifications and standards are in our everyday lives 
1. Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its 
Consequences (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999). 
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and the effects, often unnoticed, these systems can have. Numerous 
empirical cases bolstering the theoretical discussions illustrate the ways 
in which classification has, to use the authors' well-chosen term, 
"torqued" human lives to painful degrees (the discussion of South Africa 
under apartheid is especially powerful). 
The analysis developed by Bowker and Star revolves around a 
conceptual dichotomy between 'formal classification' and 'informal 
classification.' Formal classification involves systems, schemes or 
standards, most often bureaucratic, which are ubiquitous to the point of 
near-invisibility and yet shape the actions of individuals operating within 
them. Informal classification is the label used by the authors to designate 
the ad hoc, non-standardized classification practices performed by 
individuals in response to the demands and constraints imposed on them 
by formal classification schemes. This dichotomy provides significant 
theoretical purchase upon the instances of real life classification taken up 
in Sorting Things Out. However, as I argue here the 'adversarial' 
relationship the authors posit between the two sides of the dichotomy can 
be reformulated and made sensitive to more than one kind of relationship 
between formal and informal classification. To refine Bowker and Star's 
conceptual tools I rub them against fresh instances of classification not 
considered in the book: the processes through which the Canadian 
Government evaluates and responds to requests for financial aid from 
citizens claiming to have been the victims of events popularly thought of 
as disasters. Disasters are fertile, unexplored sites for sociological 
analyses as they inevitably trigger classification questions such as 'was 
that a disaster?' or 'does this event merit disaster funding?' I draw on 
data gathered from Canadian legislation, federal policy documents and 
interviews with Canadian government officials, to highlight instances in 
which formal and informal classification do not have an adversarial 
relationship, as asserted by Bowker and Star, but a complementary one. 
Classification Divided: Formal vs. Informal 
Bowker and Star take a dichotomized model of classification as their 
conceptual point of departure. On one side of the divide we are presented 
with informal classification as everyday activities performed by people, 
referred to alternately as 'human,' 'ad hoc,' 'folk,' 'vernacular,' 'local,' 
and 'of limited duration.' On the other side, the authors posit formal 
classification as bureaucratic, standardized and systemic (as well as 
scientific, discussed below). A central thesis is that as people engage in 
everyday, informal classification activities (sorting the mail, planning our 
day, selecting our groceries, etc.), "we rub these ad hoc classifications 
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against an increasingly elaborate large-scale system of formal categories 
and standards."2 This fully captures the dichotomy, projecting an image 
of 'human' classification being rubbed 'against' formal, systemic 
classification as if it were a wall. 'We' perform informal, ad hoc 
classification, but we do not perform formal, systemic classification— 
rather, we perform 'up against' it. 
Informal classification processes are also called 'work-arounds' as they 
are consistently presented as subversive of formal classification systems. 
Work-arounds are portrayed exclusively as a feature of informal 
classifying, exogenous to formal classifying. For example, in discussing 
work-arounds and standards the authors argue, "imposed standards will 
produce work-arounds. Because imposed standards cannot account for 
every local contingency, users will tailor standardized forms, information 
systems, schedules, and so forth to fit their needs."3 Bowker and Star 
argue that formal classification systems cannot in practice be sufficiently 
tailored to successfully respond to all possible local, real conditions 
presented to them. In response, people inevitably develop their own 
classifying techniques that inevitably operate through some subversion of 
the formal scheme. 
Throughout their case-studies, whether discussing nurses' work in 
hospitals, medical classification of diseases or life in apartheid South 
Africa, Bowker and Star repeatedly show fractures developing between 
formal and informal classifying, and show that the people who must 
navigate these fractures do so through the development of their own 
informal work-arounds. These treatments, however, do not address, either 
empirically or theoretically, instances in which informal classification, 
rather than being an outside response intended to subvert a formal 
classification system, is actually demanded by a formal system, thereby 
buttressing it. Explicating such a relationship of 'reinforcement' between 
formal and informal classifying would still depend on the conceptual 
dichotomy developed by Bowker and Star, but would also strengthen it 
by mapping a new complexity into the relationship between its parts. 
I present such a case study in the next section, in which I discuss the 
classification of disasters, for purposes of financial compensation, by the 
Canadian Government. Disaster funding presents a new and useful 
empirical avenue into analyses of classification as social practice for a 
variety of reasons. Canadian federal disaster funding offers empirical 
data, in the form of federal and provincial legislation, policy, insiders' 
documentation and personal communications, yet untapped by social 
2. Ibid., 6. 
3. Ibid., 158. 
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scientists seeking to study questions of social practice through the lens of 
classification theory. By applying Bowker and Star's conceptual tools to 
the case of Canadian disaster funding, I show that, in practice, informal 
classification is not limited to a subversive and reactive role with respect 
to formal schemes. In this instance, formal classification actually calls for 
the performance of informal classification by those individuals working 
within its bureaucratic frameworks. 
Given Bowker and Star's linking of formal classification with 
bureaucratic systems and schemes, I place federal legislation and written 
policy concerning disaster funding on the formal side of the divide. Given 
their linking of informal classification with everyday human activity and 
work-arounds, I place the everyday activities of federal administrators 
and the ways in which they have tailored legislation and policy to aid 
their own tasks on the informal side of the divide. 
Classifying Disasters: Formal Classification 
The Legislation 
Canadian legislation does not take up questions of financial compensa-
tion for disasters in any detail; for this one must examine federal policy, 
which I discuss below. However, there are two pieces of legislation, The 
Emergencies Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th supp.)) and The Emergency 
Preparedness Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 6 (4th supp.)), from which all policy 
and procedures involved in federal and provincial disaster response 
derive legal authority; I begin by reviewing these. 
The Emergencies Act defines a 'national emergency' as "an urgent and 
critical situation of a temporary nature that (a) seriously endangers the 
lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions of nature as 
to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or (b) 
seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve 
the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that 
cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada" (s.3). 
The Act distinguishes four types of national emergencies, and a Public 
Welfare Emergency is defined as "caused by a real or imminent (a) fire, 
flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon, (b) 
disease in human beings, animals or plants, or (c) accident or pollution 
and that results in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a 
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breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources, so 
serious as to be a national emergency" (s.5)4. 
That is the extent to which the text of the Emergencies Act deals with 
disasters or federal disaster response, but a Government of Canada Fact 
Sheet, an online information document without any official status called 
'Canada's Emergency Management System', specifies that: 
Emergency management in Canada is based on the following principles: It is up to 
the individual to know what to do in an emergency. If the individual is unable to 
cope, governments respond progressively, as their capabilities and resources are 
needed. Most local emergencies are managed by local response organizations, 
which are normally the first to respond. Every province and territory also has an 
Emergency Measures Organization (EMO), which manages any large scale 
emergencies (prevention, preparedness, response and recovery) and provides 
assistance and support to municipal or community response teams as required.5 
This model, where aid is requested from below to the next higher level, 
rather than offered down, is how Canadian disaster response flows across 
all levels of government; federal officials call it the 'cascading-up' 
model6. Payments are made following the same scheme in reverse: 
federal payments are received only by provincial governments, who 
transfer the funds out to municipalities that have the responsibility of 
distributing payments to individuals and households. 
The second relevant piece of legislation, the Emergency Preparedness 
Act, lists Ministerial responsibilities "for advancing civil preparedness in 
Canada for emergencies of all types, including... the development and 
implementation of civil emergency plans." Included in these duties are 
"the provision of assistance, other than financial assistance, to a province 
during or after a provincial emergency; and to provide financial 
assistance to a province when authorized pursuant to section 9" (s.5, 2b 
and 2c). The relevant portions of section 9 read as follows: 
4. Of the four types of national emergency outlined in the Emergencies Act, this is the 
only one relating to disasters. The other three types distinguish different kinds of human-
caused emergencies. 
5. Canada's Emergency Management System, 2004, http://www.ocipep.gc.ca/ 
info_pro/fact_sheets/general/PDF/english/EM_can_emerg_man_sys.pdf (March 2006), 
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Government of Canada. 
This web-page has recently been archived because of oranizational adjustments within 
federal disaster response. 
6. As my empirical analysis will remain at the federal level, I have not critically 
investigated the accuracy of this 'cascading-up' model laid out in the government 
discourse. In a personal communication, an expert in the field of Canadian disaster issues 
informed me that this model is more myth than reality, often violated, and should not be 
taken as actual policy. 
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The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister, make 
orders or regulations... (c) declaring a provincial emergency to be of concern to 
the federal government; and (d) authorizing the provision of assistance, including 
financial assistance, to a province when a provincial emergency in the province 
has been declared to be of concern to the federal government and the province has 
requested assistance. 
Disasters need not be so severe as to be declared a 'national emer-
gency', pursuant to the Emergencies Act, in order to invoke federal 
financial aid. All that is required is that the event be evaluated as serious 
enough to 'be of concern to the federal government'. The criteria for 
making that determination are not elaborated within any Canadian 
legislation—to find those one must turn to federal policy. TThte office of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness is the only 
federal office officially responsible for utilizing disaster-funding policy. 
The Federal Office Responsible for Disaster Classification 
Until 2003, all disaster preparedness and financial aid duties were the 
responsibility of offices within the portfolio of the Ministry of Defense. 
In 2003 a new federal department with its own Minister was created, 
called Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness7. This department now 
handles disaster preparedness duties through an office currently 
designated Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness 
(CIPEP). CIPEP derives its legislative authority and mandate from the 
Emergency Preparedness Act and has a variety of responsibilities which 
are summed up as two "key mandates": (1) "to provide national 
leadership in a new, modern and comprehensive approach to protecting 
Canada's critical infrastructure" and (2) "to be the government's primary 
agent for ensuring national civil emergency preparedness—for all types 
of emergencies."8 CIPEP is not an emergency response organization that 
is 'activated' upon declaration of an emergency or disaster, but an 
administrative body that has ongoing responsibilities to ensure the 
'emergency preparedness' of all federal-level government organizations 
and the public at large. All provincial requests for disaster funding are 
made directly to CIPEP, and it is CIPEP officials who use disaster-
7. Despite having its own Minister, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is 
referred to within federal discourse as a department and not a Ministry. 
8. CIPEP: Who We Are, 2004, http://ww3.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/whoweare/index_e.asp 
(March 2006), Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, 
Government of Canada. This web-page has recently been archived because of 
oranizational adjustments within federal disaster response. 
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funding policy to evaluate those requests9. In these evaluations CIPEP 
officials do indeed engage in the kinds of informal, ad hoc classifying 
proposed by Bowker and Star; however, those practices cannot be 
considered completely subversive of, or exogenous to, the formal 
classification scheme within which they occur, as the authors propose. 
Rather, the formal classification scheme, in the textual form of a policy 
document called the DFAA, calls for the performance of informal 
classifying practices. 
The Disaster Classification Policy 
There is only one document officially recognized as policy that is 
involved in the processes through which CIPEP officials evaluate funding 
requests. This policy piece, "Disaster Financial Assistance—Manual to 
assist in the interpretation of federal guidelines,"10 is a publicly available 
document containing Cabinet-approved guidelines created in 1970. 
Before 1970 there were no standardized guidelines in place for federal 
disaster financial assistance. Without the coordination of a central office 
like CIPEP, requests for assistance flowed through any number of 
different provincial and federal offices, administrators, ministries and 
ministers. Money transfers could be labeled as just about anything and 
cost sharing between provincial and federal governments varied from 
case to case.11 
The creation of what was to become known to insiders as the Disaster 
Financial Assistance Arrangements, or DFAA, is credited to a small 
group of federal ministers seeking to deal with three separate and 
financially significant provincial requests for aid in 197012. Politicians 
9. Much of the information that follows about CIPEP officials and their everyday 
activities is based on interviews conducted by me with officials within the Canadian 
Government. These guides did not supply information that is restricted in any official 
sense; rather, they provided insiders' accounts of everyday, informal disaster 
classification processes that could not have been discerned with exclusive focus upon 
written material. 
10. "Disaster Financial Assistance: Manual to assist in the interpretation of federal 
guidelines," EPC 22/88, 1970. Government of Canada Public Information Guide, 
http://ocipep-bpiepc.gc.ca/prg/em/dfaa/manual-en.asp (March 2006), Government of 
Canada. 
11. Exhaustive research into publicly accessible documents such as Parliamentary 
Debates and Journals yielded no mention of the creation or implementation of this 
document. This is unsurprising as the Manual has the official designation of 'Cabinet 
approved guidelines', which can be developed internally by Executive officials without 
Parliamentary approval. 
12. No publicly available documents identity these three events. The first three events 
listed by the CIPEP Working Document (discussed below) as receiving DFAA funding 
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and administrators drew up the guidelines; there were no consultations 
with engineers, social scientists or any other expert groups involved in 
the study of disasters. Those involved in their creation developed the 
guidelines as a short-term quick fix for the immediate problems resulting 
from three simultaneous major disasters, and as a possible first step 
towards a more permanent program; the guidelines were never intended 
to serve a long-term solution to questions of disaster aid. Nonetheless, the 
text created in 1970 is now part of the larger 'Manual' that is considered 
by CEPEP officials to be the only policy set with official bearing on those 
evaluations. 
The twenty-six page DFAA manual presents two principal criteria 
which CIPEP officials are expected to use to identify events that are, to 
use the insiders' term, 'DFAAable,' or eligible for federal aid. These two 
criteria are provincial financial hardship and eligibility. To qualify, an 
event must lead to damages the repair of which would constitute 
"financial hardship" to the province. Chapter one, section two of the 
DFAA states that the "definition of what constitutes financial hardship to 
a province is implied in the formula for determining federal financial 
assistance." The formula, reproduced in Table 1, is a sliding scale where 
financial hardship begins after the province spends more than $1 per 
capita on damages related to that disaster. 
Expenditure per 
Capita of Provincial 
Population 
Federal Share Provincial 
Share 
$0to$ l 0% 100% 
$1 to $3 50% 50% 
$3 to $5 75% 25% 
$5 plus 90% 10% 
TABLE 1: Formula for determining federal financial assistance 
Financial hardship is an effective tool for classifying disasters since it 
reduces questions of severity to a dollar figure and provides a clear 
boundary between qualification and non-qualification. It serves as a 
classifying tool by telling CIPEP officials the one quantifiable 
characteristic, out of a potentially infinite number of quantifiable and 
unquantifiable characteristics, on which they should focus. 
are a 1970 flood in New Brunswick, a 1970 windstorm in Ontario and a 1971 hurricane in 
Nova Scotia. 
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The second principal criterion set out in the DFAA, eligibility, has the 
opposite effect. Rather than pointing to any clearly defined characteris-
tics, the DFAA's presentation of 'eligibility' is, I argue, designed 
intentionally to leave that category vague and open to interpretation. 
Determining eligibility is made exceedingly complicated because the text 
of the DFAA makes no mention at all of kinds of disasters and at no point 
are disaster-types related to eligibility for federal funding. Instead, the 
DFAA provides long lists of examples of costs that are eligible for DFAA 
funding. The lists are too long to reproduce in full and too heterogeneous 
to be usefully summarized here. In most cases, however, the descriptions 
were left short and vague as with the following, each of which is a 
separate eligible cost: special security measures; special communications 
facilities; special registration and enquiry services. On the whole, the 
language used throughout the lists of eligible costs intentionally paints 
eligibility in very broad strokes. Most importantly, where examples are 
provided they are not intended to delimit categories, only suggest them. 
This intentional vagueness has led to difficulties for CIPEP officials in 
their day-to-day administration of disaster funding. As predicted by 
Bowker and Star, these officials have had to find their own ways to adapt. 
Classifying Disasters: Informal Classification 
The first work-around developed by CIPEP officials concerns changes 
to the text of the DFAA. All lists of eligible costs found in the DFAA 
were written in 1970—none have been added since. However, the text of 
the DFAA has roughly quadrupled since 1970 and almost all of the added 
text has been devoted to lists of /«eligible costs. Chapter four, titled 
'Interpretation—General Principles', specifies that "given that the aim of 
the federal arrangements is to provide basic assistance to restore public 
works to their pre-disaster condition and to facilitate the restoration of 
essential, personal property of private citizens, farmsteads, and small 
businesses, certain items are not eligible. These are covered in Chapter 
three, paragraph 13, of this manual and are further defined as follows"; 
the rest of chapter is a heterogeneous list of examples of costs with no 
common link among them. Chapters five and six, titled 'Interpretation-
Public Sector' and 'Interpretation—Private Sector' respectively, also 
focus on very specific examples of kinds of costs that cannot receive 
DFAA funding. Again, the lists are too heterogeneous to be summed up 
here because they are a collection of real-life costs that were submitted 
for disaster funding in a piecemeal fashion after specific events. Any time 
a new kind of request was made that was not clearly dealt with in the text 
of the DFAA and a CIPEP official decided to refuse it, that determination 
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was recorded and eventually added to the text of the Manual. All of the 
text added to the original Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements 
since 1970 was added in order to 'tighten' the broad categories designed 
into the DFAA. This tightening has been one kind of informal work-
around developed by CIPEP officials in response to the openness of the 
original DFAA guidelines. 
Examination of the second CIPEP work-around requires some 
explanation of the everyday practices involved in disaster classification. 
The DFAA provides the following instructions for starting the funding 
request process: 
When a disaster occurs, it is usually apparent within a few days, as to whether it 
will qualify for federal assistance. If the disaster appears to be sufficiently severe, 
and if the province affected wants federal financial assistance, then a request must 
be made by the province. This usually takes the form of a letter or Telex from the 
provincial Minister responsible for emergency measures to the federal Minister 
Responsible for Emergency Preparedness. 
While the DFAA describes the request process as taking place between 
Ministers, in practice federal administrators do most of the work 
surrounding disaster-funding requests. The formal letter is usually only 
sent after there have already been numerous discussions between 
provincial officials, and administrators working in CIPEP's Department 
of Financial Assistance Programs: the Director, based in Ottawa, and ten 
Regional Directors, each based in one province. 
The DFAA defines a Regional Director as "the federal official who 
initially provides liaison with provincial officials in responding to the 
immediate effects of a disaster... [and] co-ordinates federal participation 
in damage assessment and in the review of provincial requests for 
assistance." The Regional Director is the first federal official to apply 
DFAA regulations to provincial claims. If a Regional Director judges 
that, based on early evidence, damages will qualify for funding she 
transmits to the CIPEP Director of Financial Assistance Programs certain 
key details, including examples of damages, estimates of damage dollar-
value and a general label for the event that caused the damages. That last 
detail is important because, notwithstanding the 'tightening' of DFAA 
guidelines that has taken place since 1970, CIPEP officials continue to 
have difficulty working within the broad parameters of the DFAA. As a 
result, they have found a way unofficially to incorporate disaster type into 
their evaluations, with an informal work-around. 
CIPEP keeps an electronic spreadsheet with no Government of Canada 
title or code that has as its electronic file name "Office of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness Working 
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Document" and is referred to by CIPEP officials as the "Working 
Document." The Working Document contains information on every event 
since 1970 for which a DFAA request was submitted. This spreadsheet 
has no official status and is not considered policy by those who use it. 
According to my guides, it was created by CIPEP officials as a way to 
quickly and easily access a written history of DFAA funding. Every time 
a provincial request for funding is made, a file is started to collect all the 
paper information (letters, printed e-mails, briefing notes both official 
and unofficial, press releases, etc.) involved in the evaluation of that 
claim. Insiders pointed to the general unwieldiness of these paper files as 
the reason for the creation of the Working Document, which reduces the 
complexity of each case to a more manageable set of variables. Table 2 is 
an abstracted model of one entry from the Working Document. 
Province Event Audited Federal Paid Date Account 
Total Share Closed 
NFLD-01 1973 Storm $0 $0 $0 Oct 1973 X 
Remarks: A sudden severe storm struck the Atlantic provinces on June 17, 1973 
causing extensive damage to fishermen's gear. Request for financial assistance 
from Premier, July 17,1973. 
TABLE 2: The Working Document 
The 'Event' category is of immediate concern for my argument. 
Because the Working Document was originally designed to record past 
events and not for the evaluation of new requests, there was no reason not 
to include a simple description of the event that caused the damages. At 
the time, the 'Event' category was considered one indexing tool among 
many, all developed with the principal goal of facilitating research work. 
However, I found that CIPEP officials were in fact consulting the 
Working Document during the preliminary stages of DFAA requests 
precisely because of the facility afforded by the 'Event' field. I traced this 
change in working practices to the event commonly referred to as the 
'Oka Crisis.' 
In the spring of 1990, Mohawks of Kanesatake armed themselves and 
set up manned roadblocks in order to prevent municipal authorities of the 
town of Oka, Quebec, from taking possession of land the Mohawks 
argued belonged to them. In June, after months of halting negotiations, 
Oka's mayor called in the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), the provincial police, 
to remove the barricades. Shots were fired and an SQ officer was killed. 
Hearing about the exchange at Oka, Mohawk Warriors, living on the 
Kahnawake reserve 29 km southwest of Montreal, blockaded a highly-
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trafficked Montreal bridge. The SQ reacted by dispatching more officers 
to block all access to the Kahnawake reserve. For the next month, the SQ 
remained deployed in both areas, facing off against masked and armed 
Mohawks across two separate demilitarized zones. On August 5, Quebec 
Premier Robert Bourassa gave the Mohawks a 48-hour deadline to 
negotiate a settlement; on the 8th, he invoked the National Defence Act 
and the Attorney General of Quebec made a request directly to the federal 
Chief of Defence Staff for military support. On August 20, Canadian 
military forces were deployed to Oka and Kahnawake. On the 29th, after 
some negotiations, soldiers and Mohawks began working together to 
dismantle the blockades on the Mercier Bridge, and by September 2 all of 
the barricades on the bridge and in Kanesatake were gone. 
In the fall of 1990, the Quebec government requested and received 
DFAA funding for certain damages caused during the Oka standoffs. 
While the event itself was clearly the result of intentional human action 
and thus not a 'disaster' as specified by the Emergencies Act13, officials 
working for Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC, the name at the time 
for the office currently called CIPEP) determined that some of the 
damages, similar to those incurred by businesses during disasters, 
qualified for funding under DFAA guidelines of eligibility. A short time 
later, the Treasury Board of the Canadian Government contacted EPC to 
request that they 'tighten up' their evaluation scheme so as to disqualify 
similar future events from receiving funding. That request was enough to 
motivate EPC officials, from that point forward, to take closer accoimt of 
the types of events that were behind any DFAA requests. The Working 
Document, with its easy-to-use 'Event' category, became a classification 
tool: officials began to compare requests for funding with the history of 
DFAA funding in order to verify some precedent for funding that type of 
event. No request for funding had been dismissed because of a lack of 
precedent; nevertheless, the Working Document and the 'Event type' 
category have become key elements in the classification of disasters. 
The DFAA: Formal and Informal Instead of Formal/Informal 
The DFAA begins with the statement "[t]hese guidelines are general in 
nature and each disaster raises questions relating to their interpretation. 
This manual is intended to aid in making such interpretations." 
According to my guides, defining the DFAA as an aid to interpretation 
rather than a classification system was a deliberate choice on the part of 
its original designers. Despite the desire for standards and increased 
13. As discussed above. 
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accountability, the federal officials who designed the DFAA felt it 
appropriate that disaster funding continue to be distributed on the basis of 
measurable impacts on lives, emphasizing human suffering over an 
abstracted typology of events. Their goal was to ensure the perpetual 
inclusion of a 'human element' in decisions of disaster funding, and they 
therefore intentionally eschewed the development of a rigid, restrictive 
disaster classification scheme in favour of a more open, suggestive 
scheme. As discussed, one way this was achieved was to avoid defining 
categories of eligibility in specific terms, leaving them instead broad or 
'fuzzy' and including lists of examples to suggest rather than eliminate 
possibilities. Thus, Chapter three of the DFAA specifies "[t]hese 
guidelines are meant for application to all types of disasters and to 
varying circumstances across the country. They have been developed, 
therefore, using general terms accompanied by examples of intent where 
necessary" (emphasis added). Government of Canada officials would be 
able to use the DFAA to get a sense of kinds of costs that were 
considered eligible at the time, but could not use the DFAA to reject, out-
of-hand, new kinds of costs. If the text of the DFAA ended there, the 
work-arounds developed by CIPEP officials to tighten up its too-broad 
parameters would support Bowker and Star's model, as we would have a 
case of work-arounds designed to counter the apparently expansive 
spending scheme envisioned by the DFAA's designers and built into the 
formal scheme. 
But the designers did more than leave the DFAA guidelines open to 
interpretation; they went so far as to include in the text of Chapter three 
the instruction that "it should not be constituted that the omission of any 
item or contingency means that it need not be considered at the time of a 
disaster. Each event will require an analysis of its own special 
requirements and government policy to deal with them" (emphasis 
added). This phrase states definitively the necessity for human 
involvement in and careful consideration of every request for disaster 
funding, emphasizing the need for analysis of the DFAA policy in such 
matters. Despite its broad parameters, the DFAA was not intended as an 
indulgent catch-all; rather, it was designed with the express intention that 
ad hoc decision-making guided by it, and not rules codified within it, 
limit disaster funding. The DFAA actually calls for its own work-
arounds, which are therefore reinforcing rather than subversive of the 
formal classification system. This is a more nuanced relationship between 
formal and informal classifying than the strictly adversarial relationship 
presented in Sorting Things Out. 
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Conclusions: Reformulating the Dichotomy 
Sorting Things Out presents to social scientists powerful conceptual 
tools with which to interrogate social practice through instances of 
classification. A subtle yet important addition to be made to Bowker and 
Star's tool-kit is the recognition that informal, human classification is not 
necessarily subversive of formal, bureaucratic classification systems. 
Simply accepting that relationship between formal and informal 
classification misses the complexities that can be coded into formal 
systems: if the formal system calls for informal classification as part of its 
operation, informal classifying will actually reinforce it. A more robust 
approach to the study of classification maintains the conceptually useful 
formal/informal divide, but does not presume the character of the 
relationship between the two sides of the divide. Those studying formal 
and informal classifying should avoid such assumptions and seek instead 
to develop understandings of formal and informal classification arising 
out of the real-life instances of classification under inspection. 
